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CUSTOMARY LAW PRINCIPLES AS A TOOL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY: 
INNOVATING NIGERIAN CUSTOMARY PRACTICES USING LESSONS FROM 
UGANDAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS 
 
 
SIMISOLA OBATUSIN 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The concept of human rights has been criticized by some African scholars and leaders as 
a Western imposition of values, with such criticisms delegitimizing human rights efforts in 
Africa.  In addition, international human rights institutions are often too far-removed from the 
everyday realities of most Africans, and thus are abstract means of vindicating basic rights and 
freedoms.  This Note argues, in light of this context, and in response to anti-imperialist human 
rights criticisms, that a more immediate and seemingly legitimate means of human rights reform 
lies in courts using customary law norms, and the principles inherent at their origin, to push 
customary law to be more human rights compatible.  The Note analyses a case from South Africa 
and a case from Uganda, where the customary practices of first-son inheritance and “bride price” 
were at issue, to showcase how Nigerian courts can draw on historical customary law principles 
to advance the law.  The Note discusses women’s rights in Nigeria as a body of law where such 
reform can be useful.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The human rights regime has been the subject of criticism from scholars who contend it 
is an imperialist imposition of Western values.1  International human rights movements have 
faced sharp resistance from non-Western critics, yet the legitimacy of human rights norms is 
crucial in order for it to be effectively used to advance justice.2  This paper argues that a possible 
avenue for human rights norms to gain legitimacy, and for international human rights agendas to 
be effective in Africa, is for judicial systems and human rights advocates to find principles in the 
history of customary practices that are compatible with international human rights law and use 
such principles to advance the law.  In this manner, advocating for change comes through human 
rights norms that have existed historically within the local legal systems in which they operate.  
Every society has a concept of justice, or a sense of right and wrong, from which one can find 
human-rights-compatible principles.3  This includes the very societies where critiques that 
human rights are a neo-colonialist instrument come from.  This paper focuses on human rights 
efforts in Africa, while analyzing historical African customary law principles that certain 
customary practices developed from.4   
                                                 
1See generally, PHILLIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 531–56 (2013); Raimon Panikkar, Is the 
Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?, DIOGENES, Dec. 1, 1982 at 75; YASUAKI ONUMA, A TRANSCIVILIZATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 370 (2010).  Generally, arguments have been made by both African and non-African 
scholars who critique the universality of human rights.  The use of “Western” in this paper refers to Euro-American or Anglo-
American tradition. 
2See Lauren Fielder, African Courts and African Values: Harmonizing International Human Rights and Customary Law, in 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 177 (Kyriaki Topidi & Lauren Fielder eds., 2013).  See also, Sally Engle 
Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle, 108 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 38, 49 (2006). 
Engle states, “[t]his is the paradox of making human rights in the vernacular: To be accepted, they have to be tailored to the local 
context and resonant with the local cultural framework. However, to be part of the human rights system, they must emphasize 
individualism, autonomy, choice, bodily integrity, and equality—ideas embedded in the legal documents that constitute human 
rights law.” 
3MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW 222 (2001); Richard D. Schwartz, Human Rights in an Evolving World Culture, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 368 (Abdullahi A. An-Na’im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990). 
4The discussion around “Africa” in this paper generally refers to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Africa’s history, rife with an amalgamation of historically exploitative cultural contact 
with the Western world, has put Africans on the defensive and led to the resistance of legal 
reforms that are perceived to be neo-colonialist in nature.5  The legacy from colonialism and the 
vestiges of anti-imperialist sentiments provoke the need for a more autochthonous approach to 
human rights.  Legal principles and norms often reflect the culture from which they originate; 
they therefore inherently have values that are connected to their origin.6  Today’s human rights 
norms reflect values which derived from historic events that affected some parts of the world 
more than others, namely, the global North more than Africa.7  
Human rights norms would be more representative and widely accepted amongst African 
communities if they derived from local norms and were not removed from the historical context 
they developed in.  Human rights principles found in customary law, a legal system consisting of 
traditional laws and practices of African peoples, can provide a compelling alternative to 
advance justice, in response to the alienation some communities may feel in appealing to 
internationally-made treaties that they had little voice in developing.8  At the same time, using 
local customary law in this way diminishes the argument that human rights are a Western 
                                                 
5Such events include, the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, colonial conquest, Cold War era political maneuvering, present-day 
extractive firms from Western countries, etc.  See MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE 
(2002).  For more historical analyses, see e.g. WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA (1973), and ROBERT 
BATES, WHEN THINGS FELL APART (2008). 
6American Anthropological Association, Statement on Human Rights, 49 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 539, 542 (1947).  
7The norms discussed here generally refer to those derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  See Merry, supra 
note 2, at 49 (referring to how human rights emphasis on individualism, autonomy, etc. are part of “a modernist view of the 
individual and society embedded in the global North,” and “whether this is the most effective approach . . . is an open question.”). 
See generally, ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 58–154; see also, MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2008). 
8Manfred Hinz wrote, “[i]n training programmes of the Human Rights and Documentation Centre at the University of Namibia, 
we have always paid special attention to the perception of human rights by those who attended our programmes. Some of these 
perceptions we had to listen to were: human rights are western concepts; human rights interfere with the values of our culture; 
human rights are there to protect criminals; human rights prevent us from doing the job.”  Fielder, supra note 2, at 183–84. 
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imposition, an argument which may sometimes be made as a pretext to legitimize practices that 
are harmful to or subjugate certain groups.9 
Customary law in Africa existed prior to the common law and civil law systems imposed 
through colonial rule.10  Throughout African history, customary law has undergone significant 
changes—existing customary frameworks have evolved through societal developments brought 
about by decades of cross-cultural influences.  Many customary practices no longer serve their 
historical purposes.11 Some have been distorted to push the interests of one group at the expense 
of another or to maintain social inequalities.12  Certain customary law principles concerning 
women provide an example; for instance, bride price and primogeniture are two customary 
practices that are now used in ways detached from their historical purpose, as discussed further 
below. 
These customary practices relating to women also reveal the tension between African 
customary law and international human rights law.  The treatment of women in African 
customary law has received a great deal of attention for its seemingly oppressive practices, 
which entrench power imbalances and adversely affect women.  Along with bride price and 
primogeniture, examples of such critiqued customary practices include child marriage,13 female 
                                                 
9See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 1–
35 (2006).  Merry argues that struggles over cultural values could in fact be reformulated as struggles over power; she describes 
feminist scholars that identify culture and tradition as means of legitimating the oppression of women.  See also, Joseph Mlenga, 
How sociology enriches human rights: The case study of Malawi’s first openly-gay couple, in BEYOND THE LAW: MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 95, 95 (Frans Viljoen ed., 2012), discussing how the “rights for gays may be 
institutionalized in Malawi considering the country’s dependence on aid” from “donor countries, who call for acceptance of 
homosexuals.” 
10See generally, Gordon R. Woodman, Some Realism about Customary Law – The West African Experience, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 
128 (1969).  
11See discussion infra, IV.  
12Gordon R. Woodman, A Survey of Customary Laws in Africa in Search of Lessons for the Future, in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN 
CUSTOMARY LAW 9, 12 (Jeanmarie Fenrich et al. eds., 2011). 
13Ending Child Marriage in Africa- Opening the Door for Girls' Education, Health, and Freedom from Violence, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/09/ending-child-marriage-africa. 
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circumcision,14 polygamy,15 and divorce law.16  This note addresses customary practices in 
present day Nigeria, and argues for using the governing principles behind such practices that 
were present at an earlier point in their history, and that are more compatible with human rights, 
in advocating for change.  This was successfully done in cases before the courts of Uganda and 
South Africa, used here as examples.  Although there is immense diversity amongst African 
cultures, and thus in African customs and customary law, key features of customary law that 
serve to disenfranchise women are widely present in similar forms across the continent.  This 
note will discuss in detail two practices: bride price and primogeniture, drawing influence from 
two significant court decisions in Uganda and South Africa, Mifumi and Bhe, respectively.  
Customary law affects a vast share of society in Africa.  Human rights as an abstract 
concept fails to adequately advance the rights of those who it was created for if its reach does not 
extend fully to customary practices.  As Fenrich, Galizzi, and Higgins explain, peoples’ lives 
across the continent are regulated by customary law, whereas formal legal systems are often 
beyond the reach of many, in particular the poor and uneducated.17  Thus, weaving human rights 
into a legal system in a manner that incorporates customary practices, which affects those who 
                                                 
14Eliminating Female genital mutilation: An interagency statement UNAIDS, UNDP, UNECA, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCHR, 
UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2008), 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/43839/1/9789241596442_eng.pdf.  
15Ruth Gaffney-Rhys, Polygamy: A Human Right or Human Rights’ Violation?, 2 WOMEN IN SOCIETY (2011); Caitlin Shay, 
Human Rights Group Challenges Uganda’s Polygamy Laws, HUM. RTS. BRIEF (Apr. 6, 2010), http://hrbrief.org/2010/04/human-
rights-group-challenges-uganda%E2%80%99s-polygamy-laws/.  
16DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE, LEGAL PLURALISM AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN FRANCOPHONE WEST AFRICA, DANISH INSTITUTE FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Stéphanie Lagoutte, ed. 2014), 
https://www.humanrights.dk/sites/humanrights.dk/files/media/billeder/nyheder/engelsk_version.pdf. 
17Jeanmarie Fenrich et al., Introduction in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 1, 1 (Jeanmarie Fenrich et al.eds., 2011).   
The editors state:   
“In villages, towns, and cities across the African continent, peoples’ lives continue to be regulated by 
customary laws.  Traditional legal systems are often the only ones functioning in remote corners of the 
continent, where the reach of the State is at best limited and at times non-existent.  Even where available, the 
formal legal system, with its legitimate obstacles, intricate rules, formalities and expense, is often out of reach 
of the poor or uneducated.  In addition, the persistence of long-standing expectations and social practices 
informed by customary laws has given rise to many problems in enforcing contract or constitutional or 
statutory law.” 
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are likely to be most marginalized in society, is essential.  Cornell Law Professor Muna Ndulo 
has similarly argued, “[i]t is important to evaluate customary norms in the context of human 
rights because legal norms capture and reinforce deep cultural norms and community 
practices.”18 
It should be highlighted that this Note goes beyond a mere romanticization of a historical, 
pre-colonial past whose customs and traditions may no longer be relevant for African 
contemporary societies.  It aims instead to address those historical principles that can be applied 
today to advance human rights in a manner that is contextual.  As stated by Dr. Aquiline Tarimo, 
“[i]t is worthless to continue articulating the way of life found in African traditional societies 
without showing their relevancy in post-traditional African societies.”19 
This Note examines customary practices in Nigeria, while drawing on how South Africa 
and Uganda have used historical customary principles to advance human rights in their 
constitutional courts.  Part II addresses the criticisms of human rights and discusses the 
limitations to the effective implementation of human rights laws.  It explains how the barriers to 
human rights in Africa call for human rights approaches that are more relatable to the people it 
seeks to protect.  Part III discusses customary law and its role in society, with a particular focus 
on Nigeria.  Certain controversial customary practices regarding women will be addressed as 
potential areas where customary principles may be useful for reform.  Part IV proposes using a 
historical analysis of customary principles in jurisprudence to advance the law, by drawing on 
examples of landmark cases in the Supreme Courts of Uganda and South Africa, discussing 
customary practices, their origins, and their contemporary applicability.  It highlights lessons 
from these judicial decisions that Nigerian courts can incorporate. 
                                                 
18Muna Ndulo, African Customary Law, Customs, and Women’s Rights, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 87, 90 (2011). 
19AQUILINE TARIMO, HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURAL DIFFERENCES, AND THE CHURCH IN AFRICA 11 (2004). 
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II. CRITIQUES AND FAILURES OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
Human rights has only moderately been able to have an impact on those most oppressed 
in Africa.  However, in a continent so vast, even the present-day advancements in human rights 
are quite remarkable.20  That being said, there is still considerable room to advance the human 
rights regime in ways that will allow it to retain its legitimacy and accomplish the goals it was 
developed to achieve.  One way of advancing human rights in this regard is by making it more 
relatable and authentic to Africans whom it applies to.21  Politicians may sign international 
human rights treaties, or promote legal developments to conform formal laws to international 
human rights norms, but a vast majority of Africans are excluded from the discourse when these 
norms fail to reach places where customary law is predominant.  When this is the case because 
local communities resist human rights, human-rights-compatible principles found in customary 
law can be used to advance the law. 
This section describes how the failure to incorporate African voices into the human rights 
framework from its foundation has led to resistance against the regime.  Debates of cultural 
relativism and universality highlight arguments within the human rights discourse that are 
relevant to African scholars’ and communities’ criticisms.  This section then describes how 
existing regimes may be insufficient in their application to several parts of the continent where 
formal laws govern less of societal day-to-day functioning than customary laws do.  It presents 
the rejection of human rights in contemporary contexts in Africa. 
A. THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
                                                 
20See infra Parts II.2.ii and II.3.  
21As Tarimo states, “the fact is that for a theoretical assumption to be valid a perception arising from concrete social life must 
support it.” TARIMO, supra note 19, at 9 (discussing the debate between cultural relativists and ethical universalists, and calling 
for the examining of the validity of theoretical assumptions inherent in an abstract conceptualization of human rights). 
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The human rights discourse derived from a context that was particularly non-universal.  
At the end of World War II, the most powerful countries in the world founded the United 
Nations, through the U.N. Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to 
assert solidarity over universal principles and denounce the crimes against humanity perpetrated 
against Jews in the twentieth century.22  The UDHR, drafted against the backdrop of the Cold 
War and thus subject to the ideological battles between the global powers of the time, was 
approved in 1948 by the U.N. General Assembly.  It was the primary formulation of the human 
rights regime until the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Political Rights (ICESCR) were adopted in 
1976.23  
Although the Allies played a leading role in creating the UDHR and the U.N. Charter, 
they did so through institutional arrangements that strived to be more representative of the global 
community.24  Nonetheless, during this period, most African countries were under colonial rule, 
and their involvement in the normative and procedural framework behind the developing regime 
was negligible.25  Makau Mutua, a prominent Kenyan-American scholar, stated, “[t]he human 
                                                 
22See Virginia A. Leary, The Effect of Western Perspectives on International Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: 
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 15; International Human Rights Law:  A Short History, UN CHRONICLE 
(January 2009), https://unchronicle.un.org/article/international-human-rights-law-short-history [https://perma.cc/CN42-AMRF]; 
GLENDON, supra note 3, at 221 (2001). 
23ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 139, 149. 
24Id. at 140.  Discussing the institutional arrangements which the human rights regime is embedded in, the authors note, “the 
basic instruments of the universal system were drafted within the different organs of the United Nations and adopted by its 
General Assembly, before . . . being submitted to states for ratification.” 
25GLENDON, supra note 22, at 221 (“It is true that much of the world's population was not represented in the UN in 1948:  large 
parts of Africa and some Asian countries remained under colonial rule; and the defeated Axis powers . . . were excluded as well . 
. .  But . . . literally hundreds of individuals from diverse backgrounds had participated.”); see also, ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra 
note 1, at 141 (stating, when discussing the votes on the draft Declaration in 1948, “[i]t is something of a jolt to realize today, in a 
decolonized and fragmented world of over 190 states, that UN membership in 1948 stood at 56 states.”). See also, CHRISTIAN 
TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 12 (2014), discussing the history of the concept of human rights 
and its European foundations.  See generally Anthony Angie, The Evolution of International Law: colonial and postcolonial 
realities, 27 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 739 (2006), discussing the constitutive role of imperialism and colonization in the 
development of international law, and how international law is characterized by a civilizing mission. 
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rights corpus, only put into effect following the atrocities of the Second World War, had its 
theoretical underpinnings in Western colonial attitudes.  It is rooted in a deep-seated sense of 
European and Western global predestination.”26  Mutua argues that human rights principles 
espoused by the regime that emerged in the late 1940s were fundamentally Western:  “[n]on-
Western philosophies and traditions particularly on the nature of man and the purposes of 
political society were either unrepresented or marginalized during the early formulation of 
human rights . . . There is no doubt that the current human rights corpus is well meaning.  But 
that is beside the point.”27 
Despite the lack of involvement in the historical events that led to the foundation of the 
human rights regime, it is worth noting that newly-independent African states were important 
driving forces behind the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) which passed in 1965.28  This Convention opened the door for such 
multilateral human rights treaties to be passed.  African states, in this regard, perhaps may not 
have been the historical drivers of the human rights regime, but are now a part of it, and through 
it, are able to shape the regime along with Western nations and exert influence towards rights 
and freedoms as they deem fit.  The push by African states to adopt the treaty had wide-reaching 
effects, including direct influence on U.S. domestic policy.29  The CERD provisions had an 
ensuing cascade effect; the enforcement mechanisms provided for in the treaty were accepted in 
all subsequent human rights treaties.30 
                                                 
26MUTUA, supra note 5, at 17. 
27Makau Mutua, The Complexity of Universalism in Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY: THE PROBLEM OF 
UNIVERSALISM 51, 61 (András Sajó ed., 2004).  
28Kathryn Sikkink, International pressure on US human rights matters now more than ever, OPENDEMOCRACY, Nov. 11, 2016, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/kathryn-sikkink/international-pressure-on-us-human-rights-matters-now-more-
than-eve.   
29Id. 
30Id. 
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B. HUMAN RIGHTS AS MORAL IMPERIALISM  
In human rights scholarship, there are criticisms that human rights are a form of moral 
imperialism, particularly in the African context.31  This section briefly outlines the debate 
between cultural relativism and universality, to reveal contrasting theoretical viewpoints behind 
human rights.  This debate provides a backdrop for understanding the sources of resistance to 
human rights in Africa and the challenges that need to be overcome for human rights to be 
viewed as legitimate in African communities.  Unique features of the African human rights 
system, described below, were made as an attempt by African scholars to legitimize human 
rights for the continent. 
i. CULTURAL RELATIVIST ARGUMENTS 
Cultural relativism challenges the universality of human rights.  The theory of cultural 
relativism includes diverse arguments, but its starting point is that the conception of rights is 
based in the cultures that they derive from, and thus different cultures will have different 
conceptions of what human rights are or should be.32  Rights are related to the self-determination 
of people, and vary by context and culture because of different notions of right and wrong and 
moral rules across the world.33  Arguments promoted by strong relativists suggest that “no 
culture or state is justified in attempting to impose on other cultures or states what must be 
                                                 
31MUTUA, supra note 5; Claude Ake, The African Context of Human Rights, AFR. TODAY, 1st Qtr – 2nd Qtr. 1987, at 5. See 
generally, MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (Berta Hernández-Truyol, ed. 2002), Laura Nader, Human Rights and 
Moral Imperialism: a Double-Edged Story, ANTHROPOLOGY NEWS, Sept. 2006, at 6. 
32ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 531. See Kofi Quashigah, Justice in the Traditional African Society within the Modern 
Constitutional Set-up, 7 JURISPRUDENCE 93, 95 (2016) (discussing the incongruence between African customary practices and the 
universal human rights’ idea of justice, noting that the universal idea of justice must reflect the circumstances and aspirations of 
the particular peoples or societies which that concept is to serve); see also Thaddeus Metz, African Conceptions of Human 
Dignity: Vitality and Community as the Ground of Human Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. REV. 19 (2012), discussing conceptions of 
dignity grounded in African moral thinking. 
33ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 531-532.  
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understood to be ideas associated particularly with it.”34  The term “culture” used by relativists is 
broad and includes political and religious ideologies as well as institutional structures.35 
Universalists, on the other hand, argue that international human rights transcend culture 
and geography.  Certain rights, such as equal protection, free speech, and freedom from torture, 
are fundamental and do not and should not vary according to culture and context.36  Human 
rights instruments generally adopt a universalist stance, purporting to extend to all people.  The 
UDHR, for example, states in its Preamble, “[n]ow, therefore the General Assembly proclaims 
this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations.”37  The UDHR has now become part of customary international law, that 
is, law which results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a 
sense of legal obligation.38  It is therefore applicable to all states regardless of whether or not 
they are signatories.  The U.N. generally takes a universalist approach to human rights law. 
Relativist critics arguing from an African point of view often target the assumption that 
human rights are individualistic.39  J. F. Holleman, a professor and ethnologist who researched 
Southern African indigenous legal systems, in an anthropological study comparing the 
peculiarities and characteristics of the African Bantu40 society with the West, found that Bantus 
are more inclined than Westerners to regard themselves communally rather than 
                                                 
34Id. 
35Id. As Bonny Ibhawoh writes, “human rights discourse at the non-formal level of social and cultural relations remains shrouded 
in a great deal of conceptual ambiguities.  For one, the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘cultural legitimacy’ have been caught in a 
considerable amount of confusion within the context of human rights discourse, because of the diversity of their uses.”  Bonny 
Ibhawoh, Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in the African State, 22 
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 838, 841 (2000). 
36Ibhawoh, supra note 35, at 841; Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400, 415-417 
(1984). 
37G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [emphasis added].  
38RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 102 (1987). 
39MUTUA, supra note 5, at 71; Ake, supra note 31, at 5; Quashigah, supra note 32, at 9, 18; Metz, supra note 32, at 25. 
40Bantu refers to ethnic groups in the Central Africa and Southern Africa regions.  
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individualistically.41  This viewpoint affects the development of the rules that govern society.  
Rules which affect the interests of the community are of greater significance than rules which 
affect the individual in the Bantu society.42  The disputes which arise out of such a community 
are therefore less impersonal in nature, whereby the approach tends towards reconciliation and 
preserving the community.43  The different approaches to dispute resolution among different 
societies globally implies an alternative approach to human rights may have been possible, yet 
the Western individualistic approach is what underlies human rights today.  As Donnelly writes, 
“human rights are inherently ‘individualistic’; they are rights held by individuals in relation to, 
even against, the state and society.”44  He further argues that traditional communitarian practices 
“cannot be extended to modern nation states and contemporary nationalist regimes.”45  This 
highlights the contrasting approaches to human rights law and legal theory.46 
In addition, the individualistic dimension to human rights is intertwined with liberal 
democracy, and thus, the human rights regime has political implications for all countries, 
                                                 
41Holleman’s study found that a Western person regards himself firstly as his individual self, “holding and exercising his 
individual rights and protecting his individual interests,” and secondly, regards himself as a member of the community with 
responsibilities and privileges therefrom.  On the other hand, the Bantu person “knows himself in the first place as a member of 
his community . . . with duties [and] responsibilities . . . and in the second place he is an individual.”  J. F. Holleman, An 
Anthropological Approach to Bantu Law, in AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 5 (Gordon R. Woodman & A. O. Obilade eds., 
1995). 
42In the Bantu society, “the approach is undoubtedly communal, in that not only do the interests of the community naturally rank 
first, but that, a person being in the first place a member of the community, the infringement of individualized interests by other 
individuals, affects the community itself more directly than it would in the West.”  Id.  (Emphasis in original). 
43Id. 
44Donnelly, supra note 36, at 411 (1984). 
45Id. Donnelly points to articles in the UDHR, such as Article 1, 2, and 7, and points out that they “reflect an essentially 
individualistic modern view of man, state and society.” Id. at 415. 
46From a philosophical perspective, a conception of personhood that is fundamentally communitarian, as in Africa, can warrant a 
different approach to human rights.  For example, it may be more duty-based.  See generally, Metz, supra note 32; see also 
Ifeanyi A. Menkiti, On the normative conception of a person, in A COMPANION TO AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 324 (Kwasi Wiredu ed., 
2006); KWAME GYEKYE, TRADITION AND MODERNITY: PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 35 (1997) (on 
philosophical discussions of the conception of personhood in Africa). 
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suggesting an ideal way in which a country ought to be governed.47  Human rights is often linked 
to democracy, and reforms of constitutions to include principles of democratic governance have 
taken place as part of the human rights or development regime in Africa.48  Nevertheless, it is 
indeed true that “the most dramatic violations of human rights in Africa have occurred in 
conditions of political dictatorship:  Amin’s Uganda, Bokassa’s Central African Republic, 
Banda’s Malawi, apartheid South Africa, and Equatorial Guinea.”49  It is empirically sound to 
draw a connection between repressive and nondemocratic governments and human rights 
violations in Africa.50  Thus, the position that some civil and political rights, regardless of their 
association with democracy, should be universal, is a justifiable position. 
The debate between relativists and universalists has a strong North-South and West-East 
dimension.51  Mutua argues: 
It is one thing for Europeans and North Americans, whose states share a common 
philosophical and legal ancestry, to create a common political and cultural 
template to govern their societies.  It is quite another to insist that their particular 
vision of society is the only permissible civilization which must now be imposed 
on all human societies, particularly those outside Europe.52 
                                                 
47MUTUA, supra note 5, at 39–70, where Mutua generally argues that human rights and Western liberal democracy are virtually 
tautological.  See generally, Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 91 (1992); 
TOMUSCHAT, supra note 25, at 155-159 (2014). 
48See Charles M. Fombad, Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa: Reflections on Some Current Challenges and 
Future Prospects, 59 BUFFALO L. REV. 1007; see also Christof Heyns & Waruguru Kaguongo, Constitutional Human Rights in 
Africa, 22 S. AFR. J. OF HUM. RTS. 673 (2006), for a comparative study of domestic constitutional provisions across Africa 
dealing with human rights, including civil and political rights and democratic freedoms. 
49Akwasi, Aidoo, Africa: Democracy without Human Rights?, 15 HUMAN RTS. Q. 703, 705 (1993). (Emphasis in original). 
Another example includes President Yaya Jammeh’s Gambia. According to Human Rights Watch’s 2016 country chapter on 
Gambia, President Jammeh, who was in power from 1994 to 2017, and had rejected the 2016 democratic election results which 
ousted him, had run a government that frequently committed serious human rights violations including arbitrary detention, 
enforced disappearances, and torture against his opposition. Gambia Events of 2015, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2016). 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/gambia [https://perma.cc/5WW2-CF6P].  
50Francis Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 25–26 (2007). See generally, Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 
87 AM. POL. SCIENCE REV. 567, 576 (1993). 
51ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 533. 
52MUTUA, supra note 5, at 19.  He continues, “The merits of the European and American civilization of human rights 
notwithstanding, all missionary work is suspect, and might easily seem a part of the colonial project.  Once again, the allegedly 
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Mutua’s arguments frame human rights as moral imperialism.  He further argues that since 1945, 
the United Nations has played a key role in preserving a Western-dominated global order.53  
Mutua writes, “[the] abstraction and apoliticization [of the human rights movement] obscure[s] 
the political character of the norms it seeks to universalize.”54  
The dichotomy between universalism and cultural relativism is not completely 
irreconcilable.55  Some human rights theorists believe that the two conceptions are compatible.  
For example, Jack Donnelly contends: 
the international consensus represented by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Human Rights Covenants, in the conditions 
of the modern world, supports a weak cultural relativist approach to human rights; 
that is, an approach that views human rights as prima facie universal, but 
recognizes culture as a limited source of exceptions and principles of 
interpretation.56   
There is agreement, at least through customary international law, that there are jus cogens 
norms, i.e. peremptory norms that ought not to be violated in the international community, while 
there is also an appreciation of different cultures.  
ii. AN “AFRICAN” CONCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
There are unique features of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR) compared to other international human rights treaties.  These demonstrate the regional 
                                                                                                                                                             
superior Europeans and North Americans descend on supposedly backward natives in the Third World with the human rights 
mission to free them from the claws of despotic governments and benighted cultures.” 
53Id. at 18. 
54Id. at 3. 
55As Mary Ann Glendon writes, “[i]f relativism and imperialism were the only choices, the prospect for the Declaration’s vision 
of human rights would be bleak.  Fortunately, this is not the case.”  GLENDON, supra note 25, at 229.  
56Donnelly, supra note 50, at 402 (Emphasis in original). 
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differences in an African conceptualization of a human rights regime.  The history of the regime 
is described here. The motivations behind the creation of the system are critical to understanding 
it.   
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter was adopted in 1963 and upheld 
similar principles to those enshrined in the UDHR.57  It firmly rooted itself in a “doctrine of 
noninterference between states,” because it was developed during a period when several 
countries were emerging from colonialism.58  The possibility of creating a convention of human 
rights was addressed at the time the OAU charter was adopted.  However, these discussions did 
not go very far because “states and other perpetrators of human rights abuses on the continent 
often used a cultural relativist argument to dispel criticism and resist change in policy and 
practice.”59  
By 1979, the OAU took steps to adopt a human rights charter.  In July 1979, the OAU 
Assembly, consisting of the Assembly of Heads of State and the Government of the OAU, called 
on the Secretary General, Mr. Edem Kodjo of Togo, to urge the Member States to create “certain 
international conventions whose ratification would help to strengthen Africa’s struggle against 
certain scourges, especially apartheid and racial discrimination, trade imbalance and 
mercenarism.”60  The Assembly called on Mr. Kodjo to organize a meeting of experts to prepare 
a draft of an African human rights charter that would establish bodies to promote and protect 
                                                 
57The OAU had 32 signatory states at this time.  Taslim O. Elias, The Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 59 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 243, 261 (1965). It was later  replaced with the African Union (AU) which launched in 2002.  RACHEL MURRAY, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN AFRICA: FROM THE OAU TO THE AFRICAN UNION 31 (2004); AU in a Nutshell, AFRICAN UNION, https://au.int/en/au-
nutshell. 
58Hakima Abbas, Africa’s Long Road to Rights, in Africa’s Long Road to Rights: Reflections on the 20th Anniversary of the 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights 1, 1 (Hakima Abbas ed., 2007).  
59Id. at 2. 
60Rapporteur’s Report (CAB/LEG/67/Draft Rapt. Rpt (II) Rev. 4), Report of the Secretary-General on the Draft African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1999, 94 (Annex II) (Christof Heyns ed., 2002). 
 17 
human and peoples’ rights.61  A committee of experts convened in Dakar to prepare the 
preliminary draft.62  In drafting the ACHPR, the drafters sought to modify the UDHR by 
including language believed to represent “African” values.63   
Firstly, the ACHPR, adopted in 1981, is unique in its conception of “Peoples’ Rights.” At 
the time of its drafting in June 1980, some delegates highlighted that in Africa, “man is part and 
parcel of the group,” and “individual rights could be explained and justified only by the rights of 
the community.”64  The major principles adopted by the committee of experts who drafted the 
ACHPR included “the specificity of African law, the different political regimes, [and] the 
importance of traditions and morals in Africa.”65  Thus, the Member States pushed for a draft 
charter that emphasized peoples’ rights. 
Secondly, the ACHPR enunciates economic, social, and cultural rights in a more robust 
manner than other international human rights treaties.  In the June 1980 meeting, the delegation 
expressed concerns for “the total liberation of Africa from foreign domination, the need to 
eradicate apartheid . . . and the need for a new economic and legal order, particularly the right to 
self-determination.”66  The desire to “eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa,” as written 
in the Preamble67  was a strong consideration during the drafting of the ACHPR.68 Thus, the 
                                                 
61Id. 
62Id. 
63Id.; B. Obinna Okere, The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights:  A 
Comparative Analysis with the European and American Systems, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 141, 145 (1984). 
64Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 60, at 95. 
65Id. 
66Id. 
67African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights pmbl, June 12, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 
[hereinafter ACHPR]. 
68Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 60, at 94-95. See also, U. O. Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
77 AM. J. INT’L L. 902, 902; Manisuli Ssenyonjo, An Introduction to the Development of the African Regional Human Rights 
System: 30 Years after the Adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in THE AFRICAN REGIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS SYSTEM: 30 YEARS AFTER THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 3, 5-6 (Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ed. 
2006). Both articles discuss the concerns of the OAU when drafting the OAU Charter, the predecessor to the ACHPR. See Okere, 
supra note 63, at 145. 
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goals of the ACHPR were the preservation of culture along with economic and social rights that 
would protect Africans from exploitative foreign activity.   
Notably, the ACHPR includes the right to economic, social, and cultural development.69  
The Preamble notes that civil and political rights “cannot be dissociated” from economic, social, 
and cultural rights. 70  The ACHPR also provides for the right to work (Article 15), the right to 
health (Article 16), the right to education and the right to take part in cultural life (Article 17) 
and the right to a general satisfactory environment (Article 24).71  This is an important departure 
from the human rights regime’s traditional focus on civil and political rights, which Western 
countries strongly advocated for.72  The right to culture, in particular, is also important to note 
because it has the potential to conflict with other human rights protections.73  
Despite the ACHPR’s attention to economic, social, and cultural rights, African States 
fail to promote the rights guaranteed in the ACHPR when governments do not make adequate 
arrangements to enforce such rights.  For example, many human rights violations are 
experienced by African communities at the hands of extractive industry firms—including oil 
companies in Nigeria,74 mining companies in Guinea,75 and diamond mining companies in Sierra 
                                                 
69ACHPR, supra note 67, at art. 22. 
70ACHPR, supra note 67, at pmbl. 
71Id. 
72Sarah Joseph & Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary ¶¶ 
(2013); Tomuschat, supra note 25, at 32, 35. For example, the United States is a party to the treaty on civil and political rights, 
the ICCPR, in contrast to the treaty on economic, social and cultural rights, the ICESCR, which the United States has, to date, not 
ratified.  Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 
http://indicators.ohchr.org/.  
73See generally Fielder, supra note 2. 
74Nigeria Should Not Do to Ogonis What Was Done to Saro-Wiwa, AFRICAN HERALD EXPRESS (Jan. 14, 2018), 
http://africanheraldexpress.com/blog8/2018/01/14/nigeria-should-not-do-to-ogonis-what-was-done-to-saro-wiwa/ 
[https://perma.cc/P78E-BY3D]. 
75Dr. Aliou Diouf, Guinée: Etude sur les entreprises et les droits de l'homme en République de Guinée, ALLAFRICA (Mar. 5, 
2014), http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201403051157.html [https://perma.cc/3ECP-2FE9]. 
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Leone76 and Zimbabwe.77  Yet governments lack the ability to successfully address the 
economic, social, and cultural rights violated under these conditions.  In such circumstances, the 
ACHPR’s provisions are noble in theory but fail to fulfill the ACHPR’s goals in practice.78  As 
stated by Obinna Okere, “it is one thing . . . to proclaim rights and quite a different matter to 
establish the infrastructure necessary for the enjoyment of these socioeconomic rights. . . . These 
socioeconomic rights are purely exhortatory.”79  In this manner, there is a gap between the rights 
African governments intend to promote and the actual efficacy of human rights in Africa simply 
by the creation of treaties. 
Finally, the ACHPR contains several provisions that outline the duties of individuals 
within the state.80  Although there is limited jurisprudence interpreting these duties, their 
inclusion in the ACHPR demonstrates Member States’ belief that for a society to function, 
individuals must have obligations to their neighbors.  Chapter II of the Charter, in Articles 27–
29, outlines individual duties.  Article 27 provides that every individual shall have duties towards 
his family and society, the State, other legally recognized communities, and the international 
community,81 and that rights and freedoms should be exercised with due regard for the rights of 
others, collective security, morality, and common interest.82  
                                                 
76Sierra Leone: Mining Boom Brings Rights Abuses, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 19, 2014), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/19/sierra-leone-mining-boom-brings-rights-abuses [https://perma.cc/2EX8-JHRU]; Sierra 
Leone mining mired in human rights concerns, ENEWS CHANNEL AFRICA (Feb. 23, 2014), https://www.enca.com/africa/sierra-
leone-mining-mired-human-rights-concerns [https://perma.cc/H6NB-ZL28]. 
77Diamond mining in Zimbabwe: A story of the people fighting state and corporate human rights abuses and their stranglehold 
on natural resources, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INT’L (Dec. 18, 2017), http://www.foei.org/features/diamond-mining-zimbabwe-
story-people-fighting-state-corporate-human-rights-abuses-stranglehold-natural-resources [https://perma.cc/5N9F-5SKK]. 
78This will be further demonstrated in the following section of this note. See infra II.C. 
79Okere, supra note 63, at 147 (1984). 
80ACHPR, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., art. 27.  
81Id.  
82Id. Article 28 and 29 outline further duties, including the duty to respect others without discrimination, to preserve the 
harmonious development of the family, to respect parents, to serve one’s national community by placing physical and intellectual 
abilities at its service, to not compromise the security of the State, to preserve and strengthen national independence and the 
 
 20 
The provisions of the African Charter do include rights that are considered universal.  
Certain rights, it seems, appear to apply across the globe, regardless of culture and context, to 
ensure a stable and functioning society.  These include, among others, the right to freedom from 
discrimination, equality, life, freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
fair trial, and freedom of assembly.83  These rights are important when considering the political 
instability and dictatorial rule of several African states in the decades since the 1960s.  Grave 
human rights violations committed in Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
Central African Republic, to name a few, reinforce the need to include these rights in human 
rights charters, especially the ACHPR.   
Claims of cultural relativism are very important, but do not justify resisting human rights 
as a whole.  The arguments of moral imperialism, and of human rights as a neocolonial concept, 
may be more apt in addressing the institutional structures on the international level charged with 
policing human rights than the rights themselves.  Taking into account relativist claims, the 
human rights framework can still be used to address issues pertinent to human beings in all forms 
of society regardless of the cultural framework in which they might be situated.   
Thus, “human rights” can be dissected in a manner that makes it applicable to all 
Africans by promoting human rights principles found in customary law.  This can be a more 
effective way of addressing violations, while also bypassing criticisms of international human 
rights institutions and the power imbalances inherent in them. 
C. HUMAN RIGHTS APPLICABILITY IN AFRICA 
                                                                                                                                                             
territorial integrity of his country, to work and pay taxes, to strengthen positive African cultural values and contribute to the 
promotion of the moral wellbeing of society, and to contribute to the achievement of African unity. 
83ACHPR, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., arts. 2–5, 7, 11. 
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The success of the ACHPR since its adoption in 1986 is debatable.  On the one hand, the 
ACHPR has created avenues for rights violations to be adjudicated in an international, 
independent quasi-judicial body.84  It has also empowered a remarkable number of non-
governmental organizations.  For example, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (“the African Commission”) allows for close participation of NGOs in its work, 
strengthening the avenues of civil society participation in human rights issues.85  The ACHPR 
provides a means for holding states accountable for human rights violations in their countries, 
and because the African Commission’s work is presided over by the African Union, there is, in 
theory at least, public pressure, both within the Africa Union and internationally, for Member 
States to adhere to their obligations and pay more attention to human rights than they perhaps 
otherwise would.  In addition, the system has set in motion the recognition of rights in other 
areas.  This is demonstrated by the recent human rights instruments regarding women’s rights,86 
entered into force in 2005, and children’s rights,87 entered into force in 1999.  As noted by 
Abbas, the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa (“Maputo 
Protocol”), entered into force in 2005, “is perceived to be groundbreaking in its breadth of 
rights,” yet it was “the fastest African treaty to come into force.”88 
On the other hand, the African human rights system leaves much to be desired.  First, it is 
the least developed compared to other regional human rights systems, perhaps because it is also 
                                                 
84Id., arts. 45–59 
85Christof Heyns & Magnus Killander, The African Regional Human Rights System, INT’L PROTECTION OF HUM. RTS.: 
ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 524 (F. Gomez Isa & K. de Feyster eds., 2006).  NGOs are allowed to submit shadow reports 
during the state reporting process (where each state party reports on its efforts to adhere to the Charter.  They may also register 
for “observer status,” propose agenda items at the Commission’s sessions, and provide support to the Commission, including 
through funding interns, organizing workshops, and developing normative resolutions alongside the Commission. 
86Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, July 11, 2003, available at 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ [hereinafter Maputo Protocol]. 
87African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/153/Rev2 (1990). 
88Abbas, supra note 58, at 5–6.  
 22 
the youngest.89  It has the fewest resources and has to contend with limited support from Member 
States.90  Compared to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, which by 2005 had 
issued an average of 100 decisions each year, the African Commission had issued only an 
average of ten decisions each year by 2012.91  
Human rights efforts have achieved limited success through the African Commission and 
such formal institutions for several reasons.  First, the African Commission recommendations are 
not formally binding.92  Although there have been efforts to give the human rights agenda in 
Africa more teeth by instituting the African Court on Human and People’s Rights (“African 
Court”), whose decisions have a stronger binding force, these efforts are still in their developing 
stages.93  Only eight states have signed on to the special declaration allowing for individuals and 
NGOs to bring a complaint against a state at the African Court, and only thirty states have 
ratified the special declaration.94 
Second, there is a lack of internal pressure within states to implement the African 
Commission’s recommendations.95  Given their already limited resources, governments are 
unlikely to implement costly measures to comply with human rights recommendations without 
                                                 
89 ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 1, at 1025. 
90Id.  See also generally Abbas, supra note 58. 
91Abbas, supra note 58, at 7. 
92Org. Of African Unity [OAU], Communications Procedure Information Sheet No. African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights, http://www.achpr.org/communications/procedure/. See also, RACHEL MURRAY & DEBRA LONG, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE FINDINGS OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 10–26 (2015). 
93About Us, AFRICAN CT. ON HUM. AND PEOPLE’S RTS., http://en.african-court.org/.  
94As of July 2017. The 8 states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Tanzania and Tunisia. Note that 
there are other avenues for the Court to issue decisions regarding a State regardless of the State signing the Declaration, for 
example, when the Commission decides to refer a case to the Court or if an AU Member State requests for the Court to give an 
advisory opinion regarding a State. See generally AFRICAN CT. ON HUM. AND PEOPLE’S RTS., 
http://www.achpr.org/about/afchpr/. See also Welcome to the African Court, AFRICAN CT. ON HUM. AND PEOPLE’S RTS., 
http://en.african-court.org/index.php/12-homepage1/1-welcome- to-the-african-court. 
95Abbas, supra note 58, at 5.  
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serious pressure to do so.96  Moreover, the lack of internal pressure weakens the force African 
Commission recommendations carry. 
This lack of pressure can be explained in part by the third factor, which is that there is 
“no widespread popularization of the [African Charter] rights and [the African Commission] 
recommendations.”97  This may be due to a lack of a concerted, multi-stakeholder effort across 
the continent.98  In addition, the fact that governments are required to approve the African 
Commission’s reports before they become public is a limiting factor to widespread public 
knowledge of the African Commission’s work.99   
Lastly, the lack of political will from governments to support an African human rights 
regime hampers its effectiveness.100  Governments generally fail to implement recommendations 
when given.101  Moreover, domestic courts are reluctant to apply international human rights law 
in their domestic decisions, and as a result, its strength is not felt as much as it could be in the 
domestic legal structure.102  
One example of the limited success of applying international human rights in domestic 
decisions, despite the ratification of international human rights treaties, is a Zimbabwean case, 
Magaya v. Magaya.103  International human rights treaties were directly implicated, yet, the 
Magistrate’s Court refused to find discrimination against women in customary intestate 
succession practices that favored male heirs, contrary to the court finding in the South African 
                                                 
96Id. 
97Id.  
98Id. 
99Id. 
100Viljoen & Louw, supra note 50, at 33. 
101Id. at 8. 
102Lauren Fielder writes, “[w]hen African courts apply international human rights law in their decisions, it may cause legitimacy 
problems, even when the state is obligated to do so under its treaty requirements.  This is problematic because the legitimacy of 
the courts is of vital concern.” Fielder, supra note 2, at 182. 
103Magaya v. Magaya, (1999) 3 LRC 35 (Zim. S.C.). 
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Bhe case.104  Zimbabwe’s Constitution at the time exempted matters involving the devolution of 
property upon death, and matters involving the application of African customary law, from the 
prohibition against discrimination.105  Moreover, the Zimbabwe Constitution, unlike South 
Africa’s, did not provide for protection against discrimination based on gender, although it did 
provide for protection against discrimination based on other factors.106  The Magaya court relied 
on this omission to uphold primogeniture, finding it to not be a violation of the Zimbabwean 
Constitution.  Despite the ratification of international human rights treaties protecting against 
gender discrimination, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court still refused to apply the protections 
because of constitutional limitations. 
The barriers faced by the African human rights system thus compound the problem of 
using international human rights as a means of advancing rights in an African context.  Todd 
Landman, a political scientist, carried out a comprehensive comparative study on human rights 
enforcement which illustrates how formal international human rights efforts are not as effective 
in Africa as in other regions.  Landman summarizes his research as follows,  
the descriptive analysis of the different measures of rights protection…showed that 
depending on the collection of rights, time-series trends show general improvement in 
political rights and mixed results for civil rights protection and the use of torture . . . 
[however,] regionally, some of the worst [human rights] performers are in the MENA 
region, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia.107   
                                                 
104Id. For a further discussion on Bhe, see infra IV.A. 
105Const. of Zim. (1980) §23. 
106The Zimbabwean Constitution at the time Magaya was decided, in 1999, provided in its anti-discrimination section 23 
(emphasis added):  
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section: 
(a) no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect; and  
(b) no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of any written law or in the 
performance of the functions of any public office or any public authority.  
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a law shall be regarded as making a provision that is discriminatory and a person 
shall be regarded as having been treated in a discriminatory manner if, as a result of that law or treatment, persons of a 
particular description by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed are prejudiced. . . 
 Const. of Zim. (1980) §23. 
107TODD LANDMAN, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 163 (2005) 
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Kayode Fayokun provides further support of human rights implementation failure in an article 
where he observes a wide gap between global standards and customary norms and practices in 
Nigeria, despite Nigeria’s status as a signatory to numerous international human rights treaties.108  
Such scholarship suggests that alternative means of advancing human rights are necessary.  This 
Note responds to the need for additional advancement in human rights in Africa by appealing to 
human rights-compatible principles in customary law. 
 
III. NIGERIAN CUSTOMARY LAW 
A. HISTORY AND MODERN RELEVANCE 
Customary law consists of traditional rules and practices that govern society, developed 
over time, and are in a constant state of evolution.  In Africa, “[c]ustomary laws and traditional 
institutions . . . constitute comprehensive legal systems that regulate the entire spectrum of 
activities from birth to death.”109  African customary laws have certain distinguishing 
characteristics.110   First, they are complex bodies of norms with varying degrees of mandatory 
force.  Second, they reflect and preserve inequalities amongst members of society in the social 
order of the communities, just as other legal systems across the world tend to do.  Third, they 
constantly change.111  As Fielder notes, “the dynamic feature of customary law potentially makes 
it an excellent vehicle for the protection of other rights, including women’s human rights.”112  
Lastly, customary laws include uncertainties—parts of customary law are objects of controversy, 
                                                 
108Kayode O. Fayokun, Gender Justice in Nigeria: Incoherence of Global Treaties and Customary Law, 12 U.S.-CHINA L.R. 677 
(2015). 
109See Fenrich et al., supra note 17. 
110Woodman, supra note 12, at 12-18. 
111Woodman states, “there is abundant empirical evidence that the content of the customary laws of Africa has changed 
significantly in the past century and continues to change today.”  Id. at 15. 
112Fielder, supra note 2, at 179. 
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as it varies from region to region, and it is sometimes unclear regarding the boundaries of whom 
it governs. 
The history of the role of customary law during colonialism is complex and varies across 
the continent.  Discussing the colonialists’ understanding of the pre-colonial legal framework in 
Africa, John Murungi writes: 
Under the delusion that Africans are law-less, Europeans have taken up the 
mission of sending missionaries of law in Africa.  These missionaries have 
accompanied other European missionaries of civilization to Africa to uplift 
Africans from the state of savagery.  They suffer from the illusion or the delusion 
that what law means has already been universally settled, and what remains is to 
have everyone else recognize and implement it.  For most of them what is ignored 
is what Africans have experienced and what they still experience in the regime 
and the empire of the Western conception of law.  This regime has not only been 
consistent with the colonization of Africans but also with the enslavement of 
Africans.  It has provided justification for the inhumane treatment of Africans.113  
Murungi’s quote highlights a link between the resistance to European “civilizing” projects and 
resistance to today’s human rights reform because its origin is closely linked to the West.  
Another scholar, Clever Mapaure, makes a similar assertion: 
Skepticism about the existence of an African jurisprudence stems from the 
mistaken belief that African customary law is only custom and not law at all.  
This can be explained by Eurocentricism and the lack of understanding about 
African ideas about law.  It is important to understand that Africans have a 
longstanding understanding of natural justice, the law and legal systems despite 
the fact that indigenous practice may have not developed in abstract theoretical 
terms.114 
Today, customary law’s fusion with formal codes of law inherited from colonial rulers 
has resulted in a pluralist legal system, consisting of statutory law, common or civil law, and 
international treaties.115  However, customary law today still plays a significant role in society.  
                                                 
113JOHN MURUNGI, AN INTRODUCTION TO AFRICAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 2 (2013). 
114Fielder, supra note 2, citing Clever Mapaure, Reinvigorating African Values for SADC: The Relevance of Traditional African 
Philosophy of Law in a Globalising World of Competing Perspectives, 1 SADC L.J. 149, 153 (2011) 
115See generally Woodman, supra note 12, at 18. Some regions also adhere to religious laws. Ndulo, supra note 18, at 87. 
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For the most part, and in most parts of the African continent, people’s lives are governed by 
customary law.116   
Customary law thus exhibits very strong potential as a tool to advance human rights.  The 
World Bank recognized the potential for change through customary law, describing it as 
“pragmatic” and “constructive,” given that it is more familiar and accessible to many.117  The 
World Development Report 2012 states: “[r]emoving gender biases in the customary system 
through sensitization, encouraging greater participation by women, and promoting the system’s 
values, such as the protection of women, should thus be encouraged. . . .  Forging links between 
the informal and formal systems can help bring about greater parity throughout the legal 
system.”118 
B. NIGERIAN CUSTOMARY LAW AND WOMEN 
The rights of women in customary law provide an area of focus which highlights the 
interrelationship between customary law and human rights.  This section describes some 
customary laws and practices in Nigeria relating to women.  The customary practices discussed 
here are disadvantageous to women, but it is possible, as the later cases will show, that from the 
history of how these customary practices came about, there are human-rights-compatible 
principles that can be drawn out.  It is, however, necessary to provide a background on the 
customary practices in Nigeria first.  In this section, customary laws are presented to demonstrate 
where there is potential for reform, as some of these laws seem to prima facie constitute 
discrimination on the basis of gender.  They highlight the areas where human rights reformers 
could direct their efforts, and provide a backdrop for the cases in Uganda and South Africa 
                                                 
116 Ndulo, supra note 18, at 87. 
117WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012: GENDER EQUALITY AND DEVELOPMENT 288–329 (2012). 
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discussed in the next section of this note.  The focus is on customs regarding traditional heads of 
power, inheritance and succession, and marriage and marriage duties.   
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the “woes of women” are often a matter 
of interest to an outside observer of African practices but, when judged against a foreign 
standard, one may misconstrue the important role women play in traditional societies, and imply 
from certain practices subordination where in fact subordination does not exist, or did not exist in 
its original form (as opposed to its present-day form).119  The practice of “bride price” is one 
such example, as will be described in the following Part IV. 
i. Traditional heads 
In Nigerian customary law, women are generally excluded from becoming traditional 
rulers.120  This is an area of customary law that could be reformed to be more compatible with 
international human rights norms.  Ascendancy in royal families is generally reserved for male 
children.121  Across all the communities in Nigeria, in the North-Central, South-East, South-
West, and South-South, the rule that ascendancy to a throne is reserved for males is ubiquitous.  
For example, females are absolutely barred in the Delta state region.122  Some kingdoms base 
ascendancy on primogeniture, while in some regions the titles for women generally reflect their 
roles as wives to the kings (e.g. “Ikeyo oro” in Oron, whose literal translation is “Mother of 
Oron”).  In 1987, the Nigerian Supreme Court held in Edewor v. Uwegba that proposed 
candidates for rulers shall be male members of the society.123  In Victor Adegoke Adewumi v. The 
                                                 
119One author, Justice Anyebe, cautions against this, stating “[t]he mistaken belief about the assumed adverse role of women 
ignores the invaluable contribution women have made, for example in the fields of culture, farming, commerce, discipline, home 
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122Id.  This is in the Delta state region of the rule of Onitsha Ukwu. 
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Attorney General of Ekiti State the Court similarly held that only members of the male line of the 
royal family who are sons of previous throne title-holders and born during the reign of the king 
are eligible as heirs.124  Comparable holdings can also be found in Adesanoye v. Adewole125 and 
Oguigo v. Oguigo, 126 where primogeniture was the rule governing heirship.  Although this 
pattern of male successors is not unlike successorship in other monarchies in other parts of the 
world, it contrasts with formal systems that have recently become more inclusive to females.127  
Advocates for female leadership should focus efforts on means of including females as 
part of the decision-makers in customary governance systems.  Studies have shown that female 
leadership can have important implications on economic growth, the dispersion of resources, and 
the development of young people in the society.128  Rulers play a prominent role in promoting 
development initiatives in their communities,129 and having women involved in those initiatives 
helps reduce inequalities and harmful effects on females.130  Customary law should be advanced 
                                                 
124Victor Adegoke Adewumi v. The Attorney General of Ekiti State [2002] 2 NWLR pt. 751, 475, in RESTATEMENT OF 
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 4., Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 20378 [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
See also General Recommendation No. 25, UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of 
Its thirtieth session, Temporary Special Measures, para. 15 (2004), 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw25years/content/english/General_Recom mendations_1-25-English.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A48C-W3XU]. (“The purpose of article 4, paragraph 1, is to accelerate the improvement of the position of 
women to achieve their de facto or substantive equality with men, and to effect the structural, social and cultural changes 
necessary to correct past and current forms and effects of discrimination against women.”). 
128For further instrumentalist arguments on gender equality and its effects on development, see generally, WORLD BANK REPORT, 
supra note 117. 
129RESTATEMENT OF CUSTOMARY LAW OF NIGERIA, supra note 123, at 52.  The author states: “Customary practice in this area is 
uniform. Community development initiatives involves various activities that promote the peace and well- being of the 
community.”  These practices include maintenance of law and order, mobilizing the community for development activities, 
mediating disputes, overseeing deliberations on matters affecting the wellbeing of the community.  RESTATEMENT OF CUSTOMARY 
LAW OF NIGERIA, supra note 123, at 53. 
130As noted by the CEDAW Committee, “[i]ndirect discrimination against women may occur when laws, policies and 
programmes are based on seemingly gender-neutral criteria which in their actual effect have a detrimental impact on women. 
Gender-neutral laws, policies and programmes . . . may be inadvertently modelled on male lifestyles and thus fail to take into 
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to push for women to be able to exert power and influence in whatever leadership role they 
might have, even where the role is not necessarily as a ruler of a kingdom.    
ii. Inheritance 
In Nigeria, where the customary law of the deceased governs inheritance law, a focus of 
concern is whether a woman can inherit property of a deceased husband or father.  Generally, 
women cannot inherit but can own property under customary law.131    
There are some instances, particularly in the South-West region, where a female member 
of the community can neither be allocated property nor can she inherit or own land.132  Because 
only males can own and inherit land in such communities, where there are no sons, land is 
inherited by the male family members of the deceased, in order of seniority.133   
In other instances, wives may constitute property under customary law in certain regions.  
In such communities, a wife may be inherited as part of the property of her deceased husband to 
the husband’s brother or any male member of his family.134  Edo state is one of the regions 
where this custom is prevalent.135   
Wives and daughters may be treated differently in Nigerian customary law for 
inheritance.  In most cases, where a husband makes a valid will, he is able to pass on his property 
to his wife.  However, the land reverts to a male child or other male relative upon the wife’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
account aspects of women’s life experiences which may differ from those of men.  These differences may exist because of 
stereotypical expectations, attitudes and behaviour directed towards women which are based on the biological differences 
between women and men.  They may also exist because of the generally existing subordination of women by men.”  General 
Recommendation No. 25, CEDAW, supra note 134, at n. 1. 
131RESTATEMENT OF CUSTOMARY LAW OF NIGERIA, supra note 123, at 82–96. 
132Id. at 82, 96. 
133Id. at 87. 
134Oke & Anor v. Oke & Anor [1974] 1 All NLR 401.  See also Obusez v. Obusez [2001] 5 NWLR 377, pt. 736 (making 
reference to the native custom.). 
135RESTATEMENT OF CUSTOMARY LAW OF NIGERIA, supra note 123, at 85–86. 
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death; this is common in Ibo communities of the South East.136  A father is customarily not to 
pass down property to his daughter— “a woman does not inherit land, neither can a father 
include his daughters as…beneficiar[ies] to inherit his landed property.”137  A woman may have 
a possessory interest in land, i.e. be able to build houses and cultivate land, but does not have a 
fee simple absolute interest, i.e. does not have complete ownership rights in the land.138  This is 
common in the South-East and South-South regions.139  Daughters are considered as belonging 
to their husbands’ or future husbands’, and thus the ownership interest in land inheritance from 
their father’s house does not extend to them.140  This is the case in Akwa, for instance.141  
The prominent feature of inheritance in various communities, as described in the 
Restatements, according to a close examination of the field research, is that inheritance of land 
and titles is patrilineal, passing through the male line of the family.142  The reason for this is cited 
as “to ensure that property remains in the family . . . from generation to generation.”143  
Patrilineal inheritance may vary from primogeniture, where the first son inherits from his father, 
to ultimogeniture, where the youngest son inherits from his father.  The heir not only inherits 
property, but also duties of his father in caring for the other children and the women in the 
family.144  The principle may vary among different ethnic groups, where some types of property 
pass through to the eldest/youngest son and other types of property are divided amongst all 
children.  In some ethnic groups, the family property is inherited by all children, including 
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137Id. at 82, 85. 
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daughters, while personal property is inherited by the first son.145  A minority practice of 
matrilineal inheritance exists, “in isolated instances,” where succession is through the female 
members of the family.146 
iii. Marriage 
Marriage in Nigeria is very central to the organization of the family unit—marriage is not 
merely between a man and a woman, but the union of both families.147  For a valid customary 
marriage to be constituted, a gift, which here will be termed a “bride price,” must be presented 
from the husband and his family to the wife’s family. 148  This takes place in a ceremony where 
the families of both parties are introduced.149  The bride price payment is important in some 
communities for determining the status of children as beneficiaries to their father’s estate.150   
Customary law permits polygamous marriages and governs how property is distributed in 
such marriages.  In most instances, when a husband dies intestate, his property is distributed to 
the sons of the wives, according to the number of wives.151  However, in some communities, 
such as in Cross River, property is shared among the wives and not the children.152  Marriage 
may exist between two women, but this is for certain objectives such as for bearing children to a 
barren woman.153  A woman to woman marriage thus differs in purpose to a same-sex marriage; 
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147Id. at 254–55. 
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“the woman who has been married is handed over to a man chosen by the woman who married 
her . . . the purpose of such a union is to bear children for the woman who married her.”154  
The customary law practices and rules pertaining to marriage, including woman-to-
woman marriages, point to the importance of preserving the family line of inheritance in 
customary tradition by ensuring there are generations to follow, through which a man can 
preserve his legacy and property.  In this way, social order and preservation of family is the 
foremost priority.  The apparent societal value of preserving social order is reflected in judicial 
doctrine, where courts prioritize maintaining social order over facilitating social justice.155 
 
IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL ADVANCEMENT THROUGH CUSTOMARY PRINCIPLES 
This section describes, through a close analysis of two cases, Bhe and Mifumi, how 
Nigerian courts can advance customary law practices towards human rights principles by looking 
at historical reasons behind such practices.  The cases from South Africa and Uganda provide 
good examples of how the courts act as a check against customary practices, i.e. primogeniture 
and bride price, that appear discriminatory yet may not have been created for the purpose of 
discriminating.  The courts appeal to customary law history as a source of human-rights-like 
principles, rather than pointing to international human rights treaties, which may be too removed 
from customary-law-governed societies to be legitimately accepted as a basis for the court’s 
decision.  As Lauren Fielder notes, “African courts have demonstrated a particular unwillingness 
to privilege international understandings of human rights over local customary practices, due in 
part to domestic political restrictions, the potential appearance of disrespect for local traditions 
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and ‘African Values’ and the fear of perceived legal impositions from the west.”156  Although 
this unwillingness may not have been the primary reason for the courts’ approach in the 
following cases, it does provide support for the argument that customary law’s historical 
principles may be a more legitimate source of appeal in judicial decisions than international 
human rights law.  The examples show how customary law principles can be used to advance 
justice when re-contextualized to fit contemporary changes in society. 
A. BHE 
In the Constitutional Court of South Africa (“the Constitutional Court”), three cases were 
jointly decided: Bhe and others v. The Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Charlotte Shibi v. Mantbeni 
Sithole and Others; and South African Human Rights Commission and the Women’s Legal 
Centre Trust v. President of the Republic of South Africa (hereinafter referred to jointly as 
“Bhe”).157  The cases concerned intestate succession in customary law, in particular, the principle 
of primogeniture.  The applicants were concerned with the rights of daughters and sisters to 
succeed a deceased African male who had died without leaving a will.158  Each of the applicants 
were contesting the customary practice that excluded females from being heirs.159  The 
Constitutional Court analyzed the customary principle of primogeniture and how it discriminates 
against female and extra-marital children.160  The Constitutional Court discussed the positive 
aspects of customary law and the historical purposes of appointing a male heir.161  It analyzed 
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changing circumstances and concluded that circumstances today no longer justify the practice.162  
The case also highlights the broader problem of codifying customary law; doing this distorts the 
purposes and values behind some customary practices which differ from the common law.163 
In the three cases before the Constitutional Court, succession was governed by the Black 
Administration Act of South Africa, which stated:  
(1) All movable property belonging to a Black and allotted by him or accruing 
under Black law or custom to any woman with whom he lived in a customary 
union, or to any house, shall upon his death devolve and be administered under 
Black law and custom.   
(2) All land in a tribal settlement held in individual tenure upon quitrent 
conditions by a Black shall devolve upon his death upon one male person, to be 
determined in accordance with tables of succession to be prescribed under 
subsection (10).164 
The tables of succession prescribed under subsection (10)(e) was as follows: 
2. If a Black dies leaving no valid will, so much of his property, including 
immovable property, as does not fall within the purview of subsection (1) or 
subsection (2) of Section 23 of the Act shall be distributed in the manner 
following: [The statute outlines a number of conditions the deceased must have 
met, and if so, “the property shall devolve as if the deceased had been a 
European.”] . . . (e) If the deceased does not fall into any of the classes described 
in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d), the property shall be distributed according to Black 
law and custom.165 
The Constitutional Court analyzed the Act in light of the Constitution which provides in 
subsection (1) that “[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law,” and in subsection (3) that “[t]he state may not unfairly discriminate directly 
or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
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conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.”166  The Constitution provides that customary law 
must be developed to promote the spirit, purpose, and object of the Bill of Rights.167  The 
Constitutional Court also considered the constitutional protection of one’s right to participate in 
the cultural life of his or her choice.168  The opinion of the majority made brief references to the 
international instruments South Africa had ratified, such as CEDAW, ACHPR, the Maputo 
Protocol, and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, in a 
footnote,169 and referenced the ICCPR and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (ACRWC) in paragraphs 53 and 55. 
The Court first stated the positive aspects of customary law, discussing customary law’s 
emphasis on consensus-seeking, provision for family, and clan meetings, which furthers the 
prevention and resolution of disputes, and the contribution it makes towards the unity of family 
structures and healthy communitarian values.170  Then, after outlining the rules of law, the Court 
discussed the racial aspect of the codification of customary law, describing its purpose as to 
create an exclusionary system of administration, which simultaneously functions as a means of 
perpetuating oppression against Africans.171 
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The applicants argued the Act had racist elements in Subsection 10 of Section 23.  The 
Constitutional Court reasoned that the Act was discriminatory because the inheritance scheme it 
provided for was determined simply by reference to skin color.  It stated, “[t]he purported 
exemption of certain Africans—who qualify—from the operation of ‘Black law and custom’ to 
the status of a ‘European’ is not only demeaning, it is overtly racist . . .  It nevertheless provides 
a contextual indicator of the purpose and intent of the overall scheme contemplated by section 23 
and the regulations.”  The Constitutional Court concluded Section 23 was discriminatory, and 
that despite its recognition of the pluralist nature of society, it was part of a racist program, 
which “could not be justified in any open and democratic society.”172  Therefore, the 
Constitutional Court found it to be in breach of the Constitution’s anti-discrimination clause 
(Section 9(3)). 
The Constitutional Court then considered the context in which the rules of customary law 
developed and how the rules served society.  The purpose of succession under customary law 
was to preserve the family, and ensure there was a family head that would provide for the 
surviving family members and serve as the new leader.173  As delineated in more detail in the 
dissent, the female family members were deemed unsuitable for this because they were assumed 
to be marrying into another family shortly thereafter.174  The Constitutional Court explained that 
succession was not merely about the distribution of the deceased’s property, but was about the 
perpetuation of the family unit, whereby the family head administered property for the benefit of 
the family unit as a whole.175  Property was collectively owned; the heir nominally acquired the 
collective property “only in the sense that he assumed control and administration of the property 
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subject to his rights and obligations as head of the family unit.”176  The heir became the new 
family head, thus customary rules were concerned more about succession to the status and 
position of the deceased rather than distribution of the deceased personal assets.177 
The majority found the history of the customary practice less redeeming than the 
dissenting opinion, reasoning that the exclusion of women kept alive a deeply embedded 
patriarchal system, which “reserved for women a position of subservience and subordination and 
in which they were regarded as perpetual minors under the tutelage of the fathers, husbands, or 
the head of the extended family.”178  The changing circumstances in communities, in particular 
the rise of urbanization and its related effects on family structure, meant that rules of succession 
had become detached from the original social implications of inherited responsibility to maintain 
the family and dependents of the deceased.179  This was so, according to the Constitutional 
Court, because nuclear families have replaced the traditional extended family structure, and now, 
the heir “does not necessarily live together with the whole extended family.”180  The 
Constitutional Court lamented that the rules of succession, through their ossification in 
legislation, textbooks, and court decisions, had not been able to adapt and change with social 
conditions and values, as they otherwise might have.181   The Court stated: “[i]nstead, they have 
over time become increasingly out of step with the real values and circumstances of the societies 
they are meant to serve and particularly the people who live in urban areas.”182  The 
Constitutional Court also stated that, regrettably, “customary law has, in my view, been distorted 
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in a manner that emphasises its patriarchal features and minimises its communitarian ones.”183  
The Constitutional Court concluded that the exclusion of women from inheritance on the 
grounds of gender was in violation of Section 9(3) of the Constitution. 
The dissenting opinion further discussed the historical purpose of primogeniture.  The 
judge found it problematic that the majority repealed the Act and the primogeniture custom 
completely, and believed it should have been amended to be consistent with the Bill of Rights.184  
He distinguished succession and inheritance in customary law:  succession is broader, pertaining 
to the transmission of all the rights, duties, powers, and privileges associated with one’s status, 
while inheritance pertains to the transmission of rights to property only.185  The judge then 
explained that upon the death of a father, the successor does not inherit all the property, but 
“steps into of the shoes the deceased by taking over the control of the family property.”186  It is in 
this context, he argued, that the terms succession and inheritance must be understood, to avoid 
perverse consequences which flow from misinterpretations.  He described in detail the social 
context in which the law of succession developed and its purpose, echoing the majority in stating 
that the family unit was the focus of social concern.187  The dissenting judge then quotes the case 
Magaya v. Magaya, in describing the rationale for the exclusion of women, which highlights a 
historical justification for the practice:  
[W]omen were always regarded as persons who would eventually leave their 
original family on marriage, after the payment of roora / lobola, to join the family 
of their husbands.  It was reasoned that in their new situation – a member of the 
husband’s family – they could not be heads of their original families, as they were 
more likely to subordinate the interests of the original family to those of their new 
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family.  It was therefore reasoned that in their new situation they would not be 
able to look after the original family.188 
The analyses of the majority and the dissent underscore the relevance of linking custom with its 
historical origin.  
In conclusion, the Constitutional Court found that, with regard to primogeniture, the 
exclusion of women from inheritance on the grounds of gender was a violation of the 
Constitution’s non-discrimination provision, because it entrenched past patterns of disadvantage 
among a vulnerable group, exacerbated by notions of patriarchy and male domination.  
Primogeniture also violated the right of women to human dignity as guaranteed in the 
Constitution, as it implied that women are not fit or competent to own and administer property.  
To the extent that primogeniture prevents all female children from inheriting property, and 
curtails the inheritance rights of male extra-marital children, it discriminated against both female 
and extra-marital children. 
This is an ideal case through which one can analyze not only customary law as it relates 
to women, but customary law as it relates to the organization of society under a colonial regime.   
It discussed how customary law can be used as a discriminatory tool itself and the problems with 
codification of customary law—a body of laws which is meant to be constantly changing.189  
Most importantly, for the purpose of this paper, it highlights how customary practices may be 
rooted in principles that were in the interest of society at its origin and may have had 
humanitarian elements behind it, but which have been subverted in its present state to serve 
different goals.   
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Customary practices should be understood in their historical context, as its function in 
society may differ at various points in its history.  With this knowledge, reform towards equality 
and human rights norms may be possible by appealing to the historical points where practices 
were more human-rights-compatible.  One such way of this reform is shown in Bhe, where the 
Constitutional Court recognized the historical purposes of primogeniture no longer are 
appropriate for contemporary society.   
B. MIFUMI 
The case Mifumi v. Attorney General & Kakuru, before the Supreme Court of Uganda 
(“Supreme Court”), concerned the marriage custom and practice of bride price and its refund, a 
practice also common in Nigeria, as described above.190  Mifumi is an NGO focused on women’s 
rights in eastern Uganda.191  The organization brought a petition challenging the constitutionality 
of the custom of bride price payment as precondition for a valid customary marriage, contending 
that it interferes with the free consent of a man and woman intending to marry, leading men to 
treat their wives as mere possessions, and thereby perpetuating inequality between men and 
women.192  This, they argued, is in contravention of Uganda’s Constitution Article 21, which 
guarantees the right to equality.193  The applicants also argued that the demand for bride price by 
parents of the bride portrayed the bride as an article on the market for sale, which amounts to 
                                                 
190Mifumi v. Att'y Gen. & Anor, (2015) Const. App. No. 2 (2014) UGSC 13.  
191Id. at 2; About Us, MIFUMI, https://mifumi.org/who-we-are . 
192Mifumi UGSC at 2–3. 
193The relevant text of the Uganda Constitution art. 21 (1994) provides: 
 21: Equality and freedom from discrimination. 
(1)       All persons are equal before and under the law in all spheres of political, economic, social and cultural life and in every 
other respect and shall enjoy equal protection of the law. 
(2)       Without prejudice to clause (1) of this article, a person shall not be discriminated against on the ground of sex, race, 
colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, social or economic standing, political opinion or disability. 
(3)       For the purposes of this article, “discriminate” means to give different treatment to different persons attributable only or 
mainly to their respective descriptions by sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, social or economic 
standing, political opinion or disability. CONST. OF UGANDA (1994), art. 21. 
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degrading treatment prohibited by Article 24 of Uganda’s Constitution.194  The applicants further 
argued that the demand for a refund of bride price upon divorce was unconstitutional.195  The 
respondents in the case appealed to the constitutional protection of culture in Article 37 of 
Uganda’s Constitution196 and the freedom of parties to choose whether they wanted to have a 
civil marriage or a customary marriage.197  The Supreme Court provided an analysis of the 
historical context of bride price and concluded that the practice itself did not violate principles of 
equality but that the demand for its refund was unconstitutional because it had no place in 
contemporary society.198   
The Court’s analysis here, as in Bhe, provides another example of how courts can look to 
historical principles in customary law to bring practices more in line with human rights 
principles.  Appealing to customary origins that are immediately understandable and within 
grasp of the population at large, whether in rural or urban areas, rather than appealing initially or 
exclusively to international human rights law, can be more effective.  The importance and 
relevance of international human rights law is not to be understated however; it has lent support 
to the reasoning and analysis of the courts in both Bhe and Mifumi, and is itself very profound in 
driving civil society engagement.199   
                                                 
194The relevant text of the Uganda Constitution art. 24 (1994) provides: 
 24: Respect for human dignity and protection from inhuman treatment. 
No person shall be subjected to any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Id. art. 24 
195Mifumi UGSC at 3. 
196 37: Right to culture and similar rights. 
Every person has a right as applicable to belong to, enjoy, practise, profess, maintain and promote any culture, cultural 
institution, language, tradition, creed or religion in community with others. CONST. OF UGANDA (1995), art. 37. 
197Mifumi UGSC at 3. 
198Id. 
199For example, in Mifumi, the NGO that initiated the suit was a human rights NGO operating under the legal framework set out 
by international human rights law. History of Mifumi, MIFUMI,  https://mifumi.org/who-we-are/history-of-mifumi. Similarly, Bhe 
was partly led by a human rights NGO, Women's Legal Center Trust, and the South African human rights state institution. Bhe, 
2005 (1) BCLR. 
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In Mifumi, the Supreme Court of Uganda looked at the term “bride price” and concluded 
it was inappropriate, stemming from the failure of colonial administrators to understand its role 
in society.  The idea that customary marriage was a “wife purchase” led to the use of the term 
“bride price.”  Colonial rule did not fully recognize customary marriage because of the 
colonizers objection to polygamy and “bride price.”  Thus, the Court stated: 
I respectfully agree with those who object to the use of the term “bride price” to 
describe the property that is given by the groom’s parents to the bride’s parents.  
The use of the word “pay” is equally wrong.  There is no market in Uganda or 
Africa for that matter where brides are purchased.  Property may be demanded by 
the bride’s kin and given by the groom’s parents in customary marriage, but it is 
wrong to call this a “price” for a bride.200 
The Supreme Court reasoned instead that bride price, historically practiced, is a gift to the 
parents of the bride, for their role in nurturing her up until the marriage day.   
After the Supreme Court noted that the custom of bride price was prevalent in many 
Ugandan communities such that the lower court erred in failing to take judicial notice of it, it 
went on to determine that bride price is not a significant factor in the promotion of gender 
inequality and violence against women.201  The Supreme Court reasoned that inequality, 
including wife battery, which the petitioners argued was a consequence of bride price, was 
neither peculiar to Uganda, nor customary marriages, nor the custom of bride price.202  The 
Supreme Court observed that male domination is rooted in cultures, traditions, and customs of 
most societies all over the world.203  
The Supreme Court found bride price to have redeemable justifications, even though it 
can be abused.  Firstly, the Supreme Court argued that bride price was good for family stability 
because the dominant emphasis is on “the formation of an alliance between two kinship groups,” 
                                                 
200Mifumi  UGSC at 6–7. 
201 Id. at 33. 
202 Id. at 27. 
203 Id. at 28. 
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not the subjection of women.204  Secondly, bride price is often a pretext rather than an actual 
reason for spousal abuse.205  More husbands give bride price and do not use it as a justification 
for abusing their wives, than those who do.206  Thus, there is no sufficient justification to repeal 
the custom.207  Lastly, bride price does not inhibit free consent into a marriage.208  A man and 
woman have the constitutional right to choose whether or not to include the bride price custom in 
their ceremonies.209  Furthermore, the bride has to give her consent to marry before the couple 
even gets to a discussion of a bride price arrangement.   
However, the Supreme Court of Uganda did find that the demand for a refund of bride 
price undermines the dignity of a woman and violates the right to equality.  On this point, the 
Supreme Court was in agreement with the lower court stating that the refund of bride price is a 
violation of Articles 31(1) and 33 of the Ugandan Constitution:210 
In my considered view, the custom of refund of bride price devalues the worth, 
respect and dignity of a woman.  I do not see any redeeming feature in it.  The 2nd 
respondent stated in his submissions that it is intended to avoid unjust enrichment.  
With respect, I do not accept this argument.  If the term “bride price” is rejected 
because it wrongly depicts a woman as a chattel, how then can refund of bride 
price be accepted? Bride price constitutes gifts to the parents of the girl for 
                                                 
204Id. at 30, (quoting Arthur Phillips & Morris Henry, Marriage Laws in Africa 7 (1971)). 
205Id. at 32. 
206Id. 
207Id. at 32–33. 
208Id. at 44. 
209Id. at 38–39. 
210 Id. at 48. The relevant text of the Uganda Constitution (1994) provides: 
33: Rights of women. 
(1)       Women shall be accorded full and equal dignity of the person with men. 
(2)       The State shall provide the facilities and opportunities necessary to enhance the welfare of women to enable them to 
realise their full potential and advancement. 
(3)       The State shall protect women and their rights, taking into account their unique status and natural maternal functions 
in society. 
(4)       Women shall have the right to equal treatment with men and that right shall include equal opportunities in political, 
economic and social activities. 
(5)       Without prejudice to article 32 of this Constitution, women shall have the right to affirmative action for the purpose 
of redressing the imbalances created by history, tradition or custom. 
(6)       Laws, cultures, customs or traditions which are against the dignity, welfare or interest of women or which undermine 
their status, are prohibited by this Constitution. CONST. OF UGANDA (1994), art. 33. 
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nurturing and taking good care of her up to her marriage, and being gifts, it should 
not be refunded.  Apart from this, the custom completely ignores the contribution 
of the woman to the marriage up to the time of its break down.  Her domestic 
labour and the children, if any, she has produced in the marriage are in many 
ethnic groups all ignored.211 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Uganda found that bride price does not promote 
inequality in marriage, does not fetter the parties’ free consent into marriage, and is not 
unconstitutional.  However, the custom of refunding bride price as a condition for dissolution of 
marriage is unconstitutional and in violation of Section 31(1) of the Ugandan Constitution.212  In 
this example, the Supreme Court examined both the customary principle on which the practice is 
based, as well as the contemporary form in which the practice is observed.  It balanced at once 
Uganda’s history, the right to practice one’s culture, and jus cogens principles of human dignity 
and equality, without basing its judgment too heavily on international human rights law.  At the 
same time, its reasoning is entirely consistent with international human rights norms.  The 
Uganda Supreme Court’s reasoning and integration of the history behind customary practices is a 
model for how the judicial system in Nigeria can approach similarly contentious customary law 
practices, which Nigeria is currently battling. 
V. APPLICABILITY TO NIGERIA AND SUGGESTIONS FOR COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
REFORMERS 
The analysis of human rights law, its historical underpinnings and its cold reception in 
local African communities, contrasted with an analysis of customary law, which permits 
                                                 
211 Mifumi UGSC at 52-53. 
212 The relevant text of the Uganda Constitution (1994) provides: 
31: Rights of the family. 
(1)       Men and women of the age of eighteen years and above have the right to marry and to found a family and are entitled to 
equal rights in marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
(2)       Parliament shall make appropriate laws for the protection of the rights of widows and widowers to inherit the property of 
their deceased spouses and to enjoy parental rights over their children. 
(3)       Marriage shall be entered into with the free consent of the man and woman intending to marry. CONST. OF UGANDA 
(1994), art. 31. 
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discriminatory practices yet also has the tendency to be misinterpreted when evaluated through 
the lens of other legal systems, underscores the need for an alternative avenue for advancing the 
rights and welfare of those who are most marginalized. This Note has looked at women as a 
primary example of a marginalized population that can benefit from the reform of customary 
practices, due to the ample research and attention ascribed to women’s rights.  However, the 
same approach advocated for in this Note may also apply to other marginalized groups, such as 
the elderly, the disabled, children, the poor, and immigrants.   
Customary law is a dynamic tool that can be used to advance positive change and may, at 
times, incorporate within it values that echo human rights principles.  Courts and human rights 
advocates can use customary law in this manner to highlight historical customary principles that 
mirror principles in human rights treaties.  Following the example of the NGOs, amicus authors, 
and the judges in Bhe and Mifumi, different actors in the Nigerian judicial system can play a 
fundamental role in pushing for positive change in Nigeria, where the same customary practices 
as are illustrated in Bhe and Mifumi exist.   
Judges and human rights activists should consider three main factors when carrying out 
this approach:  
1.  Knowledge of local context and customary practices.  To bring about change in a 
system without distorting it, one needs to be aware of the system itself and how practices operate 
within it.  This Note has provided examples, such as in Bhe, of how laws and systems become 
distorted when there is ignorance surrounding them.  The Note has also argued that human rights 
advocates must be very sensitive to the delicate balance between culture and history, and 
progressive changes.  Knowledge of custom is also important so that one is able to perceive the 
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difference between when culture is used as a pretext to entrench inequality and when it is 
divorced from its historical origin.213 
2.  A thorough understanding of international human rights law.  In order to draw 
connections between customary origins and human rights principles, and to pull custom closer 
rather than further away from human rights norms, knowledge of fundamental principles behind 
human rights is necessary. 
3.  Awareness of the mechanisms in a given society that can be used for legal reform.  
Certain avenues for change may be more effective than others depending on the context.  In this 
Note, the focus has been on using the avenue of the courts, as seen in the Bhe and Mifumi cases.  
This might be different in situations where access to courts is unavailable, courts are not 
independent, or are too costly.  Human rights advocates should take such factors into account, 
and push for change in the manner most fitting, while still looking at historical foundations of 
customary practices as the basis for human rights reform. 
Fielder argues that courts should apply the principle of statutory construction to “choose 
a construction of African customary law” that is in harmony with international law when 
domestic legislation has more than one reading, “while at the same time looking for ways to rest 
their decisions on a foundation that is African.”214  This Note pushes Fielder’s argument further 
by arguing for courts to rely on principles within customary law that are present in its historical 
foundations, and thus rest its decisions on customary foundations that are human-rights-
compatible.   
Fatou Camara makes a similar argument, asserting that “whenever the ancient law is 
more human rights friendly than the current customary law, it would be useful to draw attention 
                                                 
213Merry, supra note 9 (arguing that culture can be seen as a mode of legitimating claims to power and authority). 
214Fielder, supra note 2, at 186. 
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to that and use that ‘discovery’ to promote respect for human rights in a particular 
community.”215  He argues for identifying ancient African human rights and governance 
principles as a tool to promote socio-legal reforms, with such reforms to be understood as 
“cleaning up the house as opposed to destroying it.”216  In Camara’s argument, he offers a 
method of inquiry into ancient practices that “can be used to dismiss harmful current practices – 
either based on or blamed on customary law.”217  His argument differs from the argument 
presented in this Note in the way he draws from ancient principles.218  Camara looks to ancient 
empires, focusing particularly on ancient Egypt and using it as an earlier indigenous model from 
which to develop a research methodology.  The focus here need not extend so far back in history.  
The historical analysis here is limited in the sense that it merely seeks to find a human-rights-
compatible principle behind certain practices, as opposed to a justification derived from a 
historical presence that may not be as relevant in contemporary African societies.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
By looking to customary law, which is the primary means of addressing legal disputes for 
most of the population in Nigeria, and, on a broader level, in Africa as a whole, human rights 
advocates can find support for the change they intend to promote, and are better able to push for 
those changes, by appealing to customary law rather than solely to international human rights 
law.  Focusing on women’s rights serves the purpose of illuminating instances where this can be 
done:  customary law regarding women in Nigeria contains many practices that could be 
considered discriminatory.  The courts’ analyses in Bhe demonstrate that a historical evaluation 
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of customary practices may lead to a finding that a customary practice is devoid of its original 
purpose and thus discriminatory.  It may also demonstrate, as in Mifumi, that a customary 
practice has been misunderstood and distorted, and is thus not discriminatory as practiced.  Such 
an approach to advocating for change may be more successful than other means because 
customary law is already understood by most communities in Africa.  Therefore, this approach 
pushes for change from within, which is usually perceived to have more legitimacy than pushing 
for change from the outside. 
